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1DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSES OF LABOR SUPPLY
ACROSS PRODUCTIVITY GROUPS
Lilia Maliar and Serguei Maliar
ABSTRACT
There is a substantial amount of microeconomic evidence documenting
di®erential responses of labor supply across productivity groups. In partic-
ular, more productive individuals: (i) enjoy a higher employment rate, (ii)
have a lower volatility of employment and (iii) spend less time working at
home. This paper constructs a real business cycle model with permanent
heterogeneity in individual productivity. We calibrate the model with ¯ve
productivity groups to match key aggregate features of the U.S. economy.
We ¯nd that the model delivers most of the properties of the data.
Keywords : Ex-ante heterogeneity, Indivisible labor, Home production,
Complete markets, Search.
JEL Classification : J64, J65, D33.
21 Introduction
There is a substantial amount of evidence at the micro level documenting
di®erential responses of labor supply across productivity groups. In partic-
ular, more productive individuals: (i) enjoy a higher employment rate, (ii)
have a lower volatility of employment and (iii) spend less time working at
home.
Concerning fact (i); in the U.S. the male unemployment rate for pro-
fessional, technical and managerial workers is 1.8%, while the same rate for
laborers is 10%; in the U.K., male unemployment rates for non-manual and
for unskilled labor are 2.3% and 18.7% respectively (see Johnson and Layard
(1986), tables 16.5, 16.7). Similar tendencies are observed for other data sets,
see e.g. Moscarini (1995).
Many empirical studies provide evidence in support of fact (ii). For in-
stance, R¶ ios-Rull (1993) illustrates this fact by using age as a proxy for
individual productivity, Rosen (1968) by looking at a particular industry
and Kydland (1984) by studying the educational levels of employees. Using
data for di®erent age-sex groups, Hansen (1993) constructs labor-input series
where individual workers are weighted by relative hourly earnings. He ¯nds
that the resulting e±ciency units series display smaller °uctuations than the
physical hours series. One will expect this result if low skilled workers rep-
resent a larger fraction of the labor force during the expansions than during
the recessions.
Fact (iii)i sd o c u m e n t e db yR ¶ ios-Rull (1993). He partitions the PSID data
on U.S. households into ¯ve productivity groups and calculates the average
hours worked at home by each group. The results indicate that the workers
with the highest productivity level work almost three times less at home than
workers from the lowest productivity group. He also provides some evidence
on the di®erence in hours of home work by age-groups; given that old workers
are less productive, more hours worked at home for this group also supports
this fact.
This paper constructs a simple model with heterogeneous agents which
explains the above facts. Most features of our setup are standard in the real
business cycle (RBC) literature. In particular, we assume rational expecta-
tions, endogenous production, a competitive environment, full information,
a stochastic technology and complete markets. The economy is populated
by agents who have di®erent abilities in producing the output good and it
3is assumed that the di®erences in productivity across agents are permanent.
We assume that agents can work in the market only a ¯xed number of hours
but are free to choose the amount of time devoted to working at home. The
labor choice is modelled as in Hansen (1985) and Benhabib, Rogerson and
Wright (1991).
Besides the standard features, our model has an important new element.
We assume that individuals can a®ect the probability with which they re-
ceive a job o®er through (costly) variations in search intensity. This modi-
¯cation allows us to overcome the problem of nonuniqueness of equilibria in
Hansen's (1985) model when applied to heterogeneous agents settings.1 We
introduce the cost in terms of time, i.e. we assume that the probability of
being employed is determined by time spent on job search. The more indi-
viduals search, the higher probability of ¯nding a job they have. In terms
of Hansen's lotteries, this labor arrangement is equivalent to participating in
employment lotteries whose probabilities of success depend on the intensity
of search.
There is a large body of literature incorporating heterogeneity in produc-
tivity in the RBC models. For example, Cho and Rogerson (1988) and Prasad
(1995) construct models with two-member families in which the family mem-
bers di®er in skills. Cho (1995) develops a version of neoclassical model with
temporary heterogeneities in individual productivity, and Merz (1996) intro-
duces idiosyncratic productivity shocks in a model with matching frictions.
These papers demonstrate that incorporating the heterogeneity in produc-
tivity helps to improve on aggregate predictions of the existing models. Also,
they show that the RBC models can produce °uctuations of physical units of
labor which are larger than those of e±ciency units and, thus, can account
for the empirical ¯ndings of Hansen (1993). This literature, however, does
not provide a framework for studying di®erences in labor decisions across
productivity groups and, consequently, does not make it possible to explain
the stylized facts outlined above.
Relatively few papers consider models which provide a way to work both
at the aggregate and at the individual levels. Kydland (1984) introduces two
types of agents, skilled and unskilled, in a standard divisible labor setup. He
¯nds that the volatility of working hours is lower for skilled workers than for
unskilled. R¶ ios-Rull (1993) considers the two-period overlapping generations
model with perfectly divisible labor and home production. In his setup, ex
ante homogeneous agents acquire skills and thus make di®erent labor choices.
4The model predicts that skilled individuals work more hours in the market
and less at home than unskilled ones. However, his model fails to account for
a lower volatility of market hours of skilled workers over the business cycle.
In general, solving RBC models with heterogeneous agents is a compli-
cated task. To simplify the solution procedure, we exploit results from ag-
gregation theory. To be precise, starting from the individual maximization
problems, we derive relationships which describe the economy's aggregate be-
havior in terms of aggregate variables and known productivity parameters.
The property of aggregation allows us to solve the model with several agents
at low computational costs.
We calibrate the model with ¯ve heterogeneous consumers to match key
aggregate features of the U.S. economy. The results from simulations show
that the model is successful at replicating the stylized facts outlined in the
beginning. Speci¯cally, it predicts that high productive agents have a higher
employment rate, experience lower °uctuations in employment and work less
at home. Also, the model does reasonably well at reproducing cyclical be-
havior of macroeconomic aggregates in the U.S. economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy and
de¯nes the equilibrium. Section 3 derives the equilibrium conditions. Section
4 discusses calibration and simulation procedures. Section 5 reports the
results from simulations. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
The economy consists of S types of in¯nitely lived heterogeneous consumers,
an output producing ¯rm and an insurance company. The share of a type
s 2 S in the total population is d!s;
R
S d!s =1 : Within each type there is
a continuum of identical consumers with names on the unit interval: Agents
are heterogeneous across types with respect to their labor productivity. The
distribution of productivity parameters, fesgs2S ; is exogenously given and
does not change with time; for convenience, we assume
R
S esd!s =1 :
The representative ¯rm runs a production technology with two inputs,
capital, kt; and e±ciency labor, nt, both of which it rents from households:






t = µtf (kt;n t) ¡ rtkt ¡ wtnt; (1)
where the production function f has constant returns to scale, is concave,
continuously di®erentiable, strictly increasing with respect to both arguments
and satis¯es the Inada conditions; µt follows a ¯rst-order Markov process.
The initial level of technology µ0 is given.
Ar e p r e s e n t a t i v ec o n s u m e ro ft y p es 2 S (further, consumer, agent, etc.)
maximizes expected life-time utility discounted at the rate ± 2 (0;1) by
choosing leisure and consumption of market and home-made goods. The
agent owns the capital stock and rents it to the ¯rm. The capital depreciates
at the rate d 2 (0;1]: In the beginning of each period, the agent is jobless.
To ¯nd a job, (s)he needs to search. Job opportunities come at random,
depending on individual search time and simple luck. "Good" luck means
that the agent gets a job and supplies a ¯xed number of hours, n; in exchange
for the e±ciency wage. In the case of "bad" luck, (s)he does not work in the
market. Independently on whether the agent works in the market or not,
(s)he can work at home.
Markets are complete, i.e. the agent can insure himself against unem-
ployment as well as against aggregate uncertainty. In the beginning of each
period, (s)he buys unemployment insurance. In the same period, the insur-
ance contract pays out one unit of consumption if the agent is unemployed
and zero otherwise. A one-period-ahead contingent claim which allows the
agent to insure against the aggregate productivity shock µ0 2 £p a y so n eu n i t
of consumption good in period t +1i ft h es h oc kµt+1 = µ0 and nothing oth-
erwise; here, £ denotes the set of all possible realizations of the technology
shock.
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dividual holdings of capital, unemployment insurance and contingent claims,
respectively. The prices of capital and labor are rt and wt: The price of one
unit of unemployment insurance is pts and the price of a contingent claim
µ 2 £i np e r i o dt is given by qt (µ): The home technology is represented








ts i st h et i m es p e n tb yt h ei n d i v i d u a lo n
working at home. Variable ¼ts denotes the time dedicated to searching for
a job in period t 2 T. This time determines the probability of employed
and unemployed states, '(¼ts)a n d( 1¡ '(¼ts)). The function ' satis¯es
'0 > 0;' 00 < 0; i.e. we assume that higher individual search e®orts increase
the probability of getting the job, but at a diminishing rate. The function
U is concave, strictly increasing and twice continuously di®erentiable in all
arguments. The expectations operator, E0; takes into account that the tech-
nology is stochastic. Initial holdings of capital and contingent claims, k0 and
m0 (µ0); are given.
The insurance company maximizes period-by-period expected pro¯ts with











(1 ¡ '(¼ts))ytsd!s: (6)
7In other words, we assume that agents' searching time can be perfectly and
costlessly monitored by the company.2 This insurance company is an exten-
sion of Hansen's (1985) risk-sharing arrangement to the heterogeneous case.



















tors of production, fkt;n tgt2T ; prices for the factors of production, frt;w tgt2T ;
prices for unemployment insurance, fptsgt2T; s2S and prices for contingent
claims, fqt (µ)gt2T; µ2£ such that given the prices, all agents maximize their
utilities (2) subject to (3) ¡ (5); the ¯rm maximizes its pro¯t (1); the in-
surance company maximizes its pro¯t (6) and all markets clear. We assume
that in equilibrium all model variables are nonnegative and the probabilities
satisfy 0 · '(¼ts) · 1 for all s 2 S and t 2 T:
3 Analytic results
It is a well-established fact that in an economy without distortions and with
complete markets, a competitive equilibrium allocation belongs to the set
of Pareto optimal allocations (First Welfare Theorem) and any Pareto opti-
mal allocation can be supported as a competitive equilibrium with transfers
(Second Welfare Theorem). It is also known that each Pareto optimal allo-
cation is a solution to the so-called planner's problem which is the problem
of maximizing the weighted sum of individual utilities subject to economy's
resource constraint. These results imply that the equilibrium in a hetero-
geneous model like ours can be computed by using the following iterative
procedure: ¯x weights on individual utilities, solve the planner's problem
and use the solution to check whether the assumed weights are consistent
with the individual life-time constraints; iterate on the above steps until the
¯xed point weights are found. More details on this algorithmic procedure
can be found, e.g., in Garcia-Mila, Marcet and Ventura (1995).
The above algorithm is costly in terms of computational time because each
iteration requires ¯nding a solution to a dynamic stochastic model. Moreover,
the cost increases with the number of agents in the economy because having
more agents implies more parameters (weights) to iterate on. Consequently,
the application of this algorithm is in practice very limited.
The solution procedure simpli¯es substantially if the aggregate dynamics
8of a heterogeneous economy do not depend on utility weights. This case is
known as perfect or Gorman aggregation, see, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995).
Under perfect aggregation one can, ¯rst, solve for aggregate quantities and
then recover individual variables from the aggregate solution. This property
makes it possible to extend the model to include any number of agents at
no additional computational cost compared to the representative agent case.
For the reasons discussed above, we restrict our attention only to a version
of the model which is compatible with aggregation. Speci¯cally, we assume:












² A2: the home production function is g (h)=Ah;
² A3: the function ' has the form
'(¼)=¯1 + ¯2 ln(1 + ¯3¼);¯ 1;¯ 2;¯ 3 > 0: (8)
where ¯1;¯ 2;¯ 3 are some parameters.
Let us comment on these assumptions. According to A1, market and
home consumption goods are perfect substitutes. This assumption is obvi-
ously restrictive, but it is consistent with U.S. data. Eichenbaum and Hansen
(1990) ¯nd that one cannot reject the hypothesis about perfect substitutabil-
ity between market goods and services from consumer durables (which can
be interpreted as home-made goods). Further, following R¶ ³os-Rull (1993),
in A2 we assume that the home technology is linear in labor (i.e. it does
not require inputs of capital) and that all individuals are equally productive
working at home. This captures two important features of home activities
that most of home work is labor intensive and that agents with di®erent mar-
ket productivities have roughly the same skills in preparing meals, cleaning,
child care, etc. Finally, according to A3, the search technology is given by
the °exible functional form (8); where the parameter ¯1 corresponds to the
probability of becoming employed if search time is zero and the parameters
¯2 and ¯3 re°ect how the initial probability increases due to search. Under
9(8), the inverse of the ¯rst derivative of the function ' is linear in ¼;t h i s
property helps us to achieve aggregation.
The individual optimality conditions are derived in the appendix. It
is also shown that risk averse agents will choose to insure themselves fully
against unemployment and that employed and unemployed agents of the
same type will always hold the same amount of capital and contingent claims.
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ts +( 1¡ '(¼ts))cmu
ts + kt+1s +
R
£qt (µ)mt+1s (µ)dµ =
kts(1 ¡ d + rt)+'(¼ts)neswt + mts (µt); (15)
where ct ´
R
S ctsd!s is total (market plus home) aggregate consumption and
¸s is the weight on utility of individual s in the associated planner's problem.
Let us brie°y discuss the individual optimality conditions and analyze
some of the model's implications at the individual level.
Equation (9) is informative and helps in understanding several properties
of the model. First, it shows how innovations to technology induce °uc-
tuations in the labor market. In particular, a positive shock increases the
return to working in market sector compared to that in home sector and, in
response, agents choose to search more for a market job. This implies that
the level of employment increases. Secondly, the condition demonstrates that
10the model can account for fact (i) discussed in the introduction. According
to (9), workers with high productivity always devote more time to searching
and, therefore, always have a higher employment rate than workers whose
productivity is low. Finally, the condition indicates that the model's pre-
dictions are consistent with the empirical regularity (ii). Indeed, using (8)
and (9); one can show that @ (@'ts=@wt)=@es < 0: This inequality implies
that the level of employment of highly productive agents is less responsive
to wage °uctuations than that of the agents whose productivity is low or, in
other words, that the volatility of employment in our model decreases with
the productivity level.
It is a well-known fact that Hansen's (1985) model has one undesirable
property: if leisure is a normal good, the unemployed agent enjoys a higher
level of utility than the employed does. It happens because, in equilibrium,
employed and unemployed agents have the same consumption level, but un-
employed have a higher level of leisure. Our model does not have this implica-
tion: according to (10) and (11); total consumption and leisure of employed
and unemployed agents of the same type are equal, and, thus, both enjoy the
same level of utility.
Equations (12) and (13) determine the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween current consumption and leisure and between current and expected
future consumption respectively: Further, condition (14) states that total
consumption of each individual is a constant share of total aggregate con-
sumption. This result is a consequence of complete markets under which
the ratio of marginal utilities of any two agents remains constant over time.
Finally, due to perfect risk sharing, agents of the same type face the same
budget constraint (15) in both employed and unemployed states.
Using individual optimality conditions, we can derive the following set of

















































ct=° ¡ A(1 ¡ ¼t)+An't + kt+1 = µtf (kt;n t)+kt(1 ¡ d); (20)
where kt ´
R
S ktsd!s: Condition (16) results from (13) and (14). Equations
(17) ¡ (19) follow after substituting (9) into the de¯nitions of the corre-
sponding variables. The aggregate resource constraint (20) is obtained after
integrating the individual budget constraint (15); substituting conditions
(10) ¡ (12) and using the fact that, in equilibrium, aggregate holdings of
contingent claims are equal to zero.
Equations (16) ¡ (20) and the prices, rt = µt@f=@kt and wt = µt@f=@nt,
determine uniquely the equilibrium aggregate quantities fct;n t;k t+1;¼ t;' tg;
provided that the equilibrium exists and is unique: Observe that none of
these conditions depends on individual variables. Precisely because of this
fact we can solve the model without iterating on the utility weights.
Once the equilibrium aggregate quantities fct;n t;k t+1;¼ t;' tg are known,
individual variables are simple to recover. Individual search time and the
probability of being employed can be found using (9) and (8) respectively.
To compute the remaining variables, we need to use the individual life-time















where U1 is marginal utility of consumption and k0
0 = k0 (1 ¡ d + r0)+
m0 (µ0): This condition restricts the expected discounted value of life-time
di®erence between consumption and labor income to be equal to initial en-




















12This equation makes it possible to compute the individual utility weights.
Given the weights, we can recover individual total consumption from (14)
and subsequently, restore market and home consumption using (10) ¡ (12):
4 Calibration and simulation procedures
We now move on to calibrate the model in order to be able to carry out
quantitative experiments. The calibration of many parameters is standard
(see e.g. Cooley and Prescott's, 1995, account of the calibration procedure).
Because of the heterogeneous agents setup, however, we need to calibrate
some further parameters on individual characteristics. In particular, we are
to choose the number of heterogeneous agents in the model and their pro-
ductivity levels.
Casta~ neda, D¶ iaz-Gim¶ enez and R¶ ios-Rull (1995) and R¶ ios-Rull (1993) di-
vide the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) sample for 1969-1982 in
¯ve equally-sized groups according to the individual wages and computed the
groups' averages of several individual variables including the wage, the level
of employment, the standard deviation of employment and hours worked at
home. We use the results of these studies for calibrating the model and also,
for testing the validity of the model's predictions. Given that the data are
computed for ¯ve groups, in a subsequent paper we consider a version of the
model with ¯ve heterogeneous agents. We will use the wage as a proxy for
productivity.
Table1 reproduces the levels of productivity and employment by groups.
The data in Table1 allow us to compute aggregate employment, ' =
P5
s=1 's;
and aggregate labor input, n =
P5
s=1 'ses: We will calibrate the model so
that in the steady state it reproduces these two moments.
We assume that market output, ym
t ; is produced according to the Cobb-




t ; and that the technology shock
follows the law of motion lnµt = ½lnµt¡1 + "t; where "t » N (0;¾2
"); the
autocorrelation coe±cient, ½; and the standard deviation, ¾"; are equal to





ts +( 1¡ '(¼ts))hu
ts)d!s.
To make our results comparable to existing studies, we use standard pa-
rameters whenever it is possible. The values (d;±;®;h;n) are borrowed from
Benhabib et al. (1991), where h denotes steady state level of average home
13Table 1. The distribution of productivity and employment in the U.S. economy
Group
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
Productivity, es 0.415 0.694 0.887 1.144 1.859
Employment, ϕ s 0.846 0.905 0.920 0.924 0.925
Source: Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez and Ríos-Rull (1995, table 8); the average productivity is normalized to 1.hours. The ratio of net investment to output, i=ym,i ss e tt o0 :25; the value
which is used in the RBC models without home production, see e.g. Cooley
and Prescott (1995). This is done because in our case home technology does
not require capital. Given that in the steady state investment is used to cover
depreciation of capital, i = dk; the assumed value i=ym implies the capital to
output ratio k=ym =1 0 : The latter is roughly consistent with the estimate
of capital to output ratio in the U.S. economy obtained by Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992) (k=ym =1 0 :62):
To calibrate average search time ¼, we use the following considerations.
Barron and Gilley (1981) estimate the time spent by the typical unemployed
individual on the job search as approximately eight and two-third hours per
week. The results of Arellano and Meghir (1992), and Burgess and Low
(1992) suggest that about one-third of employed agents participate in on-
the-job search. Assuming that both employed and unemployed have the
same intensity of search, these numbers imply that the average agent spends
about 2:4% of his discretionary time (total time minus personal care) on job
search.
Table2 summarizes the parameters which are ¯xed for all simulations.
The remaining parameters to choose are (¾;A;°;¯1;¯ 2;¯ 3): Regarding
the coe±cient of risk aversion, ¾; we consider two di®erent values, namely,
1:0a n d5 :0. Further, using the properties of the Cobb-Douglas production










1 ¡ i=ym + yh=ym
1 ¡ i=ym + yh=ym ¢ (1 ¡ ¼ ¡ '¢ n)=h
;
where yh=ym denotes the ratio of home output to market output. Given
yh=ym; these formulas provide a basis for calibrating A and °: To calibrate
the ratio yh=ym; we use the results of existing studies. Eisner (1988) provides
a summary of the literature measuring the magnitude of the home production
and reports estimates of the ratio yh=ym in the interval of (0:2;0:5): Benhabib
et al. (1991) argue that in a model without government taxation, the relative
size of the home production may not be too high. Consequently, they use
the ratio 0.26. Presumably, in our case, this ratio might be even lower since
we assume that the home technology does not require capital. Based on this,
we consider two alternative values, 0:15 and 0:20:
We are left to calibrate the parameters of the search technology (8):
Evaluating equations (17); (18); (19) in the steady state and substituting
14Table 2. The model’s parameters
Parameter d δα hñ nϕ i/y
m π
Value 0.025 0.99 0.36 0.28 0.33 0.302 0.904 0.25 0.024the values (¼;';n); we obtain the system of three equations with three un-
knowns, (¯1;¯ 2;¯ 3): The solution to this system gives us the values of the
search parameters.
Table3 reports the parameters (A;°;¯1;¯ 2;¯ 3) computed under two val-
ues of the home output to market output ratio:
For all numerical experiments, we set the initial aggregate capital, k0;
equal to the steady state value and assume that the initial technology shock
is µ0 =1 :
We solve for aggregate quantities fct;n t;k t+1;¼ t;' tg which satisfy equa-
tions (16) ¡ (20) by using the parametrized expectations algorithm, see e.g.
Den Haan and Marcet (1990). The length of simulations is 10000; the condi-
tional expectation in (16) is parameterized by a second-order exponentiated
polynomial. To ¯nd utility weights, we approximate the conditional expec-
tations in (22) by the corresponding averages which are computed across 400
simulated data sets of the length 10000: The statistics in Table4a n dTable5
are the averages of the corresponding variables. The averages are computed
across 400 simulated data sets of the length 115: Numbers in parenthesis are
standard deviations of the statistics. Before computing the second moments
of aggregate variables, we log and detrend the series by using the Hodrick-
Prescott ¯lter under the standard penalty for variation in quarterly data,
1600.
5 Simulation results
This section analyses quantitative implications of the model. First, we fo-
cus on aggregate dynamics. After that we turn to the predictions at the
individual level.
5.1 Aggregate predictions
In Table4; we report the ¯rst and the second moments of aggregate variables
generated by the representative agent (RA) version of the model and by the
heterogeneous agent version of the model under three alternative sets of the
parameters. For comparison, we also provide the predictions of the standard
representative agent model with home production and the corresponding
statistics for the U.S. economy.
15Table 3. The model’s parameters
Case/Parameter γ A β 1 β 2 β 3
y
h/y
m=0.15 0.808 0.599 0.863 0.0300 173.8
y
h/y
m=0.20 0.770 0.804 0.805 0.0387 758.6Table 4. Selected statistics for U.S. and artificial economies



























m 10.279 10.256 10.262 10.358 - 10.00 
c
i/y
m 0.255 0.256 0.256 0.260 - 0.250 
c
ϕ 0.906 0.904 0.904 0.904 - 0.904 
c
h 0.284 0.283 0.282 0.282 0.280 
c 0.280 
c











































































































































































a Source: Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991, table 1).
b These statistics are computed using physical hours worked.
a Source: see discussion in section 4.Table 5. The distributions of individual variables in artificial and U.S. economies
Individual variable













1 0.866 0.18 0.316 0.817 0.0006
2 0.896 0.14 0.295 0.829 0.0115
3 0.907 0.13 0.284 0.836 0.0191
4 0.917 0.12 0.270 0.844 0.0292




1 0.834 0.63 0.325 0.808 0.0015
2 0.895 0.22 0.295 0.833 0.0120
3 0.911 0.18 0.282 0.843 0.0193
4 0.927 0.16 0.267 0.855 0.0290
5 0.951 0.13 0.232 0.883 0.0559
U.S. economy 
b
1 0.846 2.28 0.394 - -
2 0.905 2.21 0.351 - -
3 0.920 1.92 0.282 - -
4 0.924 1.74 0.213 - -
5 0.925 1.37 0.160 - -
Notes: 
a Time worked at home and market consumption are group’s averages; the group’s average of a variable xts is
defined as x
e
tsϕ (π ts)+ x
u
ts(1-ϕ (π ts)).
b  Source (except for time worked at home): Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez and Ríos-Rull (1995, table 8).
Source for time worked at home: Ríos-Rull (1993, table 2); the average time is normalized to 0.28.At the aggregate level, most of the properties of the heterogeneous model
are similar to what is found in standard RBC models with homogenous
agents. Similar to the model of Benhabib et al. (1991), our model pro-
duces a negative cross-correlation of market output with hours worked at
home. Further, the model predicts that e±ciency hours are less volatile than
employment, implying that the low productive workers represent a larger
fraction of labor force during the expansion than during the recession. This
implication is in agreement with the empirical ¯nding of Hansen (1993).
Comparing the cases ¾ =1 :0a n d¾ =5 :0 shows that an increase in the coef-
¯cient of risk aversion does not a®ect signi¯cantly the aggregate predictions
of the model except for the correlation between capital and output which
becomes too low.
The main shortcoming of the model is the small °uctuations of employ-
ment over the business cycle. The results imply that under the bench-
mark value of yh=ym =0 :20; the volatility of employment is 0:128 which
is about 10 times less than the empirical counterpart. Comparison of the
cases yh=ym =0 :15 and yh=ym =0 :20 shows that an increase in the ratio
yh=ym improves on this statistic. In our model, however, this ratio cannot be
too high. The reason is that a high ratio yh=ym also implies a high return to
home hours. This can result in that individuals with low productivity have
a return to working at home which exceeds the market wage and, therefore,
they will choose not work in the market at all. This does not seem like an
entirely convincing explanation for unemployment.
The implied low volatility of labor market variables is not particularly
related to the present model but is instead a more generic property of het-
erogeneous agents models. For example, in the overlapping generations model
with heterogeneous agents considered by R¶ ios-Rull (1993), the standard de-
viation of hours is 0:089 (see R¶ ³os-Rull's table 7) which is even further away
from the empirical estimates than our results. In the two-agents version of
the standard neoclassical model studied by Garcia-Mila et al. (1995), this
statistic is 0:0 0 1( s e et h e i rt a b l e9 ) . I nf a c tt h el a s tp a p e ra r g u e st h a ti f
the heterogeneous model is calibrated to match cross sectional observations,
then such models have more di±culties in accounting for time series stylized
facts than a similar representative agent setups.
Our results con¯rm this conjecture. As we see from the table, the rep-
resentative agent version of our model (es = 1) can generate the standard
deviation of employment equal to 0:813 which is reasonably close to the cor-
16responding empirical value. The improvement relative to the heterogeneous
agents case is due to a single di®erence in the calibration procedure, which
i st h ec h o i c eo ft h ep a r a m e t e r¯2. Speci¯cally, in the representative agent
case, 'n = n and, consequently, two of the restrictions (17) ¡ (19) used for
calibrating ¯'s in the heterogeneous model become identical. Therefore, we
set ¯2 to an arbitrary value, namely, 0:80; and ¯nd ¯1 and ¯3 from the re-
maining two conditions; this gives us (¯1;¯ 2;¯ 3)=( 0 :87;0:80;2:04): It turns
out, however, that these values cannot be assumed for calibrating the hetero-
geneous model because they imply negative search time for low productivity
groups. This simple exercise indicates that the set of the parameters which is
consistent with cross sections can be very di®erent from the one under which
the model has the best chance to account for time series facts.
Another de¯ciency of the model is the degree to which employment and
productivity (ym=') are correlated with output. In the model these cor-
relations are nearly perfect while in the data they are substantially lower.
This failure is not surprising given that most of the existing RBC models
dramatically exaggerate these statistics (for a discussion see, e.g., Christiano
and Eichenbaum, 1991). Our results indicate that this problem cannot be
resolved within our simple framework.
5.2 Individual predictions
In Table 5, we report the levels of employment, the standard deviations of
employment, time worked at home, market consumption and search time for
the ¯ve productivity groups predicted by the model under two alternative
values of the home output to market output ratio. For comparison, we also
provide the corresponding quantities in the U.S. economy. We report only
the case ¾ =1 :0s i n c et h ec a s e¾ =5 :0 implies practically identical results.
The model can successfully account for a number of the moments of in-
dividual variables. It predicts that high productive individuals search more,
and, as a result, have a higher employment rate. Furthermore high produc-
tive agents experience lower °uctuations in employment, work less at home
and consume more. All of these predictions are in line with the empirical
evidence. Notice also that the levels of employment are close to those in the
data while the standard deviations of employment are somewhat lower than
the empirical values. These results are very promising and imply that key
features of the individual data can be accounted for by this rather simple
17heterogeneous agents model.
Regarding the time worked at home, R¶ ios-Rull's (1993) estimate of aver-
age annual home hours is equal to 461, which in terms of normalized to unity
discretionary time corresponds to 0.075. Benhabib et al. (1991) argue that
the average share of time worked at home is substantially higher, namely,
0.28. Given that we assume the latter value for calibrating the model, we
normalize the data of R¶ ios-Rull (1993) respectively. As we see, the model
can successfully account for the corrected distribution of home hours.
One problem is that the model generates unrealistically little cross-group
variability in consumption and, consequently, in welfare levels (up to few per-
cents). This shortcoming is due to the assumption that all individuals have
the same initial wealth. Indeed, in our model market consumption increases
with the agent's utility weight, which in turn, is an increasing function of
the initial wealth. As in the micro data, the correlation between the level of
productivity and wealth is positive,3 therefore, the variability of consump-
tion will rise once the heterogeneity in initial wealth is introduced. While
we can computationally handle such heterogeneities very easily, we did not
include them because of the lack of empirical evidence. Thus, it is somewhat
unclear whether the model is consistent or inconsistent with the data along
this dimension.
Finally, the model implies that time spent by agents on job search in-
creases across productivity groups from several minutes to more than one
hour per day. In fact, the implications of the model with respect to search
are di±cult to test because most of the existing data sets on the individual
behavior do not provide the corresponding data. Several empirical papers
construct measures of the intensity of search and use them for analyzing the
relation between search, employment and productivity. Barron and Gilley
(1981) ¯nd that the level of employment is positively related to search. Bar-
ron and Mellow (1979) analyze the determinants of search intensity for un-
employed workers and ¯nd a strong positive e®ect of education; Arellano and
Meghir (1991) report the same tendency for the employed. The relation be-
tween search and wages depends on the employment status: for unemployed,
past wages have a positive e®ect on search intensity (Barron and Mellow,
1979); for employed, the e®ect of wages is negative (Arellano and Meghir,
1991).
In short, the model's predictions at the individual level are consistent
with all empirical regularities except for a negative e®ect of wages on the
18search intensity of employed. Arellano and Meghir (1991) argue that the
last tendency re°ects the fact that search time has a higher opportunity
cost for workers whose wages are high than for those whose wages are low.
Provided that their inference is correct, the failure of the model results from
the assumption of the one-period labor contracts. Indeed, in our model the
agents may choose not to work in the market instead of searching because
t h e yg e tu n e m p l o y e da tt h ee n do fe a c hp e r i o d ;a l lo ft h e mh a v et h es a m e
opportunity cost of search, which is home work. Introducing a possibility of
long-term labor contracts would presumably help to improve on the model's
predictions along this dimension.
6 Concluding comments
We have analyzed a quantitative general equilibrium model with permanent
heterogeneity in productivity with the aim of explaining di®erential responses
of labor supply across productivity groups. The simulation results show that
the model is successful in reproducing most of the key features of the data.
In particular, at the individual level, which is our special matter of interest, it
can account for the stylized facts which we outline in the introduction. At the
aggregate level, it can generate the cyclical behavior of aggregate quantities
which is reasonably close to that in the U.S. economy. Yet the heterogeneous
version of our model does not produce better aggregate predictions than the
associated representative agent setup. This result suggests that introduc-
ing heterogeneity is not a necessary condition for a model to be successful
in explaining macroeconomic °uctuations in the real world economies. We
also stress the computational ease with which our analysis was carried out.
This computational aspect of the analysis was obtained due to the use of
aggregation theory.
The model failed along some dimensions and this provides valuable in-
sights into the main avenues for future research. Concerning aggregate pre-
dictions, it produces too little volatility of employment. As we have already
pointed out, this shortcoming is partly due to heterogeneity. Speci¯cally, it
is more di±cult to match both time series and cross sectional facts than only
time series facts as in the representative agent case. To some extent, the lack
of volatility of aggregate employment is due to the linear home technology.
Presumably, introducing a more general production function for home goods
19would improve the model's performance. The main shortcoming at the indi-
vidual level is that the model generates a positive correlation between pro-
ductivity and search time for all workers while in the data this correlation is
positive for the unemployed but negative for the employed. This de¯ciency is
attributed to a simpli¯ed structure of the labor markets. A reasonable guess
is that the inclusion of a possibility of long-term contracts will result in that
highly productive employed workers have higher opportunity cost of search
and, therefore, a lower intensity of search than workers with low productivity.
Such extensions will be considered in future research.
7 Appendix
To derive the individual optimality conditions, we use the value function
representation of the agent's problem
maxfxtsg Vs
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and Vs is the
value function of agent s 2 S:
The ¯rst order conditions for unemployment insurance holdings, capital,
hours worked at home, and holdings of contingent claims in employed and









































































ts is the agent's total consumption; Ui refers to the
derivative of the utility function with respect to the i-th argument. Notice
that given that the shock follows a ¯rst order Markov process, the probability
distribution of µt+1;P(µt+1;µ t); depends only on the previous period shock,
µt; and not on the whole history of the economy.
The equilibrium price of insurance is pts =( 1¡ 'ts (¼ts)): This together




















Equations (25); (27) and (28) imply that the holdings of capital and contin-





t+1s (µt+1): Substituting these results into the state contingent constraints
(3) gives the equilibrium holdings of unemployment insurance





Finding @Vs=@kts; updating it and combining the resulting condition with

























ts) ¢ qt (µt+1): (32)
This condition implies that the ratio of marginal utility of any two agents s;
















t+1s (µt+1); we can replace the state
contingent constraints (3) by a single one
'(¼ts)cme
ts +( 1¡ '(¼ts))cmu
ts + kt+1s +
R
£qt (µ)mt+1s (µ)dµ =
kts(1 ¡ d + rt)+'(¼ts)neswt + mts (µt): (34)
Therefore, the agent faces the same constraint (34) independently on his
























Under the functions U and ' given in (7) and (8), conditions (35) ,(28);
(29); (26); (31); (33) and (34) can be rewritten as (9) ¡ (15) respectively.
Let us derive the individual expected life-time budget constraint. Multi-




t¡1s); substituting (32) and taking con-



















































Starting from t =0 ; we use this condition to substitute recursively for fu-
ture variables. Applying the law of iterative expectations to the resulting
equation; we obtain the expected life-time budget constraint (21):
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251 Nonuniqueness can occur in the heterogeneous agents model for the
following reason. Consider Hansen's model with homogeneous agents at the
steady state and assume, as an example, that the probability of employment
is 1=2. If agents do not discount the future, an agent's two-period expected
utility is 2¢[ue=2+uu=2]; where ue,uu are utilities in two states. Observe that
there is another allocation that gives the same two-period utility: in the ¯rst
period a half of the population work and the other half is on vacation, and
in the second, the groups interchange, i.e. [1 ¢ ue +0¢ uu]+[ 0¢ ue +1¢ uu]:
In principle, the two allocations can not be ranked. Hansen (1985) exploits
the homogeneity of agents and picks up only the symmetric allocation. A
similar argument can not be applied in the heterogeneous agents case.
2 If search e®orts were not observable, then moral hazard problem would
arise. This issue is di±cult to model, however, in a dynamic economy like
ours; we leave it for future research.
3 See e.g. Garcia-Mila, Marcet and Ventura (1995).
4 In fact, ¸s is agent's utility weight in the associated planner's problem.
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